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Abstract 
Despite long-standing market liberalisation and efforts to reduce switching costs, many consumers 
have never switched telecoms provider. This paper investigates how consumer and service 
characteristics relate to switching intentions, using a sample of fixed-line broadband, mobile 
telephony and landline telephony customers from a 2015 survey conducted by ComReg, Ireland’s 
National Regulatory Authority. We add to previous work by examining a rich array of personal and 
service characteristics while controlling for both bill shock and expected gains from switching. We 
find that long-standing subscribers who have never switched are exceptionally resistant to switching. 
Bill shock is strongly associated with intention to switch, especially among those more inclined to 
switch. A similar effect arises for expected gains, especially gains over 20%. These results are 
consistent with both a preference for fair treatment and with behavioural barriers to switching that 
require large gains to overcome. The effects of bundling and of the few socioeconomic, supplier or 
application use characteristics that are statistically significant are smaller and not consistent across 
markets. This implies that willingness to switch is not simply a characteristic of certain social groups, 
but is more complex and context dependent.   
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1. Introduction 
Retail and wholesale provision of many formerly monopolised network services has been 
liberalised and deregulated in recent decades.  Telecommunications services in most 
countries are relatively far advanced along this path, with energy and public transport 
services at varying stages in different countries.  A key goal of the deregulation project is 
that effective competition should emerge and prove sustainable.  When telecoms services 
such as broadband and mobile telephony were newly-introduced and service adoption was 
rising fast, most retail competition involved attracting new adopters.  As these services 
have matured, attracting wholly new customers has become relatively less important.  In 
this new environment, the willingness and ability of consumers to compare suppliers’ 
offers and to switch if sufficiently good deals are available drive the incentives suppliers 
have to compete for existing service users.  Competition may show itself through 
substantial inter-operator switching by consumers or through attractive offers from 
suppliers to retain their customers (and probably some of both).  However, if many 
consumers are never willing to consider switching their supplier, the effectiveness of 
competition in a mature market will be reduced.  Even if competition for active customers 
is effective, inactive consumers may be left paying higher prices or, as telecoms services 
are increasingly used by multiple household members in different ways, the inability of 
households to switch to the offerings best suited to their needs may result in lost consumer 
surplus. 
Yet a persistently high proportion of consumers report that they have never switched 
provider, and this behaviour is broadly consistent across different telecoms services and 
national markets.  To illustrate, Figure 1 below shows results from a 2014 Eurobarometer 
survey that asked consumers in 28 European countries about whether they had ever 
switched supplier for three telecoms services.  There is some variation between countries, 
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but across Europe and for all services there are significant numbers of people who have 
never switched provider.    
Figure 1: National shares by telecoms service of respondents answering "No, never" 
to "Have you or someone in your household changed service provider for the 
following services?" EU28 countries, January 2014 
 
Source: analysis of European Commission 2014, QB21.2 - QB21.4 
 
Could this simply be a temporary phenomenon as competition becomes established?  
Several of the most highly developed, longest liberalised European telecoms markets are 
to the left of Figure 1, which suggests not.  Another way to check this is to compare the 
stock of people who have never switched with the flow of recent switchers.  If rapid 
switching is eliminating the stock of non-switchers, markets with high switching rates 
should have low stocks of non-switchers.  This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.  There is 
some hint of the expected negative slope in this relationship, but even markets with 13-
15% annual switching rates still have 40% or more non-switchers.  On the face of it, 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
EL PT ES AT NL SI SE DK FI IE SK UK HR IT HU DE BE LV CZ PL FR EE MT RO LT BG LU CY
%
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
Fixed line Internet Mobile telephone
  4 
therefore, having a group of active switchers in a market has little effect on the subgroup 
that does not switch at all.  
 
Figure 2: National comparisons of shares responding “No, never” and “Yes, within 
the last year” to the question “"Have you or someone in your household changed 
service provider” for Internet services, EU28 countries, January 2014 
 
Source: analysis of European Commission 2014, QB21.4 
In the same survey, across the EU28 countries, 69% of non-switchers with bundled 
packages said they had never considered switching.  This latter proportion casts doubt on 
another benign interpretation of the large proportion of non-switchers, namely that while 
they may not switch provider they may nevertheless benefit from improved offerings 
because suppliers must respond to the threat of switching.  Where a large majority of non-
switchers do not even consider switching, this threat does not appear strong.  In essence, 
greater willingness of consumers to search and consider switching supplier should also 
boost the intensity of intra-operator switching (e.g. via retention offers).  Conversely, if it 
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is possible to identify consumer groups with little willingness to consider switching, 
suppliers might have an incentive to make the service plans for such groups less attractive. 
As the next section explores in greater detail, while economic theory, behavioural 
economics and previous econometric investigations offer some insights into why so many 
consumers are reluctant to switch, our understanding of the relevant forces remains partial. 
The present paper contributes evidence from Ireland. We use data from a 2015 survey 
conducted by the Irish regulator ComReg to construct econometric models of consumer 
switching intentions for three telecoms services: fixed line broadband, mobile telephony 
and landline telephony.  
It is important to recognise upfront that, in common with many other analyses, our focus is 
on the intention to switch not switching behaviour. In principle, the two may diverge. 
Better evidence on the link between switching intentions and actual switching would be 
welcome, although we note that a large volume of work on the theory of planned 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) records strong positive correlations between intentions and 
actions across multiple domains (Armitage and Connor, 2001), which include consumer 
switching (Bansal and Taylor, 1999; 2002). While the correlation is imperfect, asking 
households to recall information and expectations from prior to a subsequent switching 
episode is also imperfect (Waddams Price and Zhu, 2016). 
The detailed nature of the survey, which is specific to telecoms markets, allows us to 
incorporate information on consumers with bundles that include one or more of these 
services, to control for multiple aspects of device usage, and to separate the effects of 
unexpectedly higher bills (“bill shock”) from expected economic gains perceived as the 
result of the normal evolution of offerings in a competitive market. Thus, we aim to cast 
additional light on possible reasons for low switching.   
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Section 2 describes the previous international literature relevant to this study and outlines 
our contribution to it.  Section 3 describes the methodology used for our empirical analysis 
and Section 4 describes the data employed.  Results are set out in Section 5. We make 
some observations on implications for policy and future research in Section 6.  
2. Background and previous research 
Empirical studies of consumer behaviour have altered the economic analysis of switching 
in recent years. This section briefly reviews how the traditional micro-economic modelling 
approach to industrial organisation has been expanded to incorporate more complex 
models of consumer behaviour, providing the context for the present study.       
2.1   Drivers of consumer activity 
Following the traditional approach to industrial organisation, early work (surveyed by 
Klemperer, 1995) focused on the impact of incentives faced by suppliers in markets with 
non-negligible consumer switching costs.  This research had an influence on the conduct 
of telecoms regulatory policy in liberalising jurisdictions.  In parallel with de jure market 
opening, regulators introduced measures to reduce switching costs and remove barriers to 
entry.  The aim was to make competition sufficiently effective that economic regulation 
(such as price controls) could be withdrawn.  Partly through measures such as mobile 
number portability, following initial implementation difficulties (Buehler et al., 2006; 
Sutherland, 2007) switching costs in telecoms markets were reduced and market outcomes 
such as switching rates and retail prices (Usero Sanchez and Asimakopoulos, 2012; Lyons, 
2010) improved.   
At least initially, the switching cost literature assumed that all consumers would carry out 
some level of search activity and make choices about whether to switch based on a 
comparison of prices and switching costs they encountered in the market.  Over time, 
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however, empirical studies demonstrated marked differences among consumers in their 
willingness to search and switch, leading regulators to shift attention to consumer 
protection.   
Prices and switching costs were never the only factors influencing consumer switching.  In 
parallel with the supplier-focused economic literature on switching costs, marketing 
researchers studied the consumer experience of switching and highlighted a broader array 
of factors that favour or hinder consumer switching in telecoms and other sectors.  The 
main group of factors highlighted by this literature concerns service failures and how they 
are handled by suppliers.  For instance, Keaveney (1995) undertook an exploratory study 
using the Critical Incident Technique, which involves collecting and analysing detailed 
data on a large number of switching incidents.  Keaveney proposed eight “service 
switching categories” that drive consumer switching behaviour, the most important drivers 
being “core service failures” (mistakes or technical problems of the service) and “failed 
service encounters” (poor service-consumer relations), followed by “pricing” (switching 
due to promotions, service charges, penalties, fees, etc).  
More recent studies concur that whether telecoms consumers are willing to switch is 
influenced by more than prices and switching costs. Lopez et al. (2006) examine fixed line 
telephony data from Spain and find that customer relationships of longer duration, greater 
depth or wider breadth reduce the propensity to switch.  In a study of North American 
mobile telephony subscribers Ranganathan et al. (2006) also emphasise how relational 
investments can reduce the likelihood of churn.  They find that churn is related to whether 
the service is used mainly on weekdays or at weekends. The authors suggest that this 
difference mirrors the use to which mobile devices are put, with weekend-intensive users 
viewing them more as “fashion and status devices, rather than for work-related or 
functional purposes”.  They also find that male users are more likely to switch provider 
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and older respondents less likely to do so.  In a study of positive attitudes to switching in 
Sweden for landline telecoms, electricity and home insurance, Gamble et al. (2009) report 
that loyalty, perceived cost of information search and, in particular, expected economic 
benefits are the main drivers.  These results are highly consistent across the three services.  
The significant role of search (as opposed to specifically switching) costs is in line with 
recent theoretical work by Wilson (2012), premised on the idea that search costs may be 
perceived with greater certainty.  
Rather than attitudes or intentions, Waddams Price and Zhu (2016) exploit a survey 
designed to obtain data on actual switching (in the previous three years), together with key 
variables likely to influence switching in eight UK markets, which included mobile, 
broadband, fixed line rental, and fixed line calls.  They record that expected gains from 
switching are significant, but find no role for expected search time, only time spent 
switching, while previous switching emerges as a strong predictor of switching. The 
analysis also notes that the estimated gain from switching required for a majority of 
consumers to switch is very high (c. £100 per month). Demographic factors are significant 
in their models; in particular, increasing income and age are found to have negative 
associations with search and switching. The authors note the difficulty that survey 
respondents had recalling the necessary information over a three-year reference period, 
leading to potential biases towards active consumers and responses likely to justify 
switching behaviour after the event. Estimated parameters also varied substantially across 
markets, underlining the importance of estimating models in each market separately, as we 
do here.     
Overall, this literature suggests, first, that aspects of consumers’ relationships with 
suppliers other than price play a role in switching and, second, that expected economic 
gains nevertheless matter. In this context, it is worth noting a potential confound when 
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trying to estimate the effect of consumers’ expectations of better value available in the 
market. One of the main drivers of the increased numbers of complaints against telecoms 
providers in recent years has been so-called “bill shock” (Xavier, 2011), where bills 
greatly exceed expectations. Where studies collect information only on expected economic 
gains from switching, perceived gains could result either from a perception of improving 
value in the market, or from disillusionment with unexpectedly high bills received from a 
current supplier. The present paper simultaneously controls for bill shock when estimating 
the contribution of expected gains to switching intentions, thereby separating the incentive 
to obtain value in a dynamic competitive market from the desire to punish or avoid 
suppliers who turned out to be unexpectedly expensive.  
2.2   Behavioural economic approaches 
In parallel with the above studies, behavioural economic approaches have gone beyond 
empirical explorations of factors that affect consumers’ propensity to switch, to examine 
psychological mechanisms and models that depart from the standard rational choice model 
of consumer behaviour (Rabin, 1998; DellaVigna, 2009).  Multiple studies comparing 
individual usage of telecoms services with available tariffs have concluded not only that 
many consumers are on suboptimal tariffs, but that their choices depart systematically and 
substantially from optimality as a result of specific behavioural biases (Lambrecht and 
Skiera, 2006; Bar-Gill and Stone, 2009; Gerpott, 2009; Grubb, 2009).  These studies 
mostly point the finger at distorted perceptions of service usage or failure to anticipate 
future usage.  
Lunn (2013) argues that telecoms products are uniquely complex.  Choosing a mobile or 
broadband product requires consumers to compare hardware, software, network and tariff 
structures simultaneously, where service usage is a constant temptation and rapid 
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technological change limits learning through repeat purchase.  Such complexity may 
increase consumers’ uncertainty when comparing products and prices.  If so, then two 
other well documented behavioural phenomena may come into play.  Firstly, switching 
suppliers may be affected by the endowment effect (Knetsch, 1989; Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler, 1990), whereby individuals are disinclined to exchange something they 
already have for something they do not.  This effect increases in strength with uncertainty 
over the value of the product in question (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002).  Secondly, if 
consumers do not feel competent to assess product value, they may be disinclined to take 
the risk of making a mistake, consistent with Heath and Tversky’s (1991; also Fox and 
Tversky, 1995) “competence hypothesis” and evidence on reluctance to make choices as 
they become increasingly complex (e.g. Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010).  This fear may be 
well founded, since there is evidence that a substantial minority of consumers who switch 
to save money in the apparently more simple energy market actually manage to switch to 
more expensive products (Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010).  To the extent that either the 
endowment effect or the competence hypothesis apply, consumers will need to perceive 
relatively large gains in order to be willing to swap their existing provider for anther one. 
Willingness to switch may also be affected by two other behavioural mechanisms. 
Empirical findings that an intention to switch often follows an experience of poor service 
are consistent with a preference for fairness that can override other considerations of price 
and quality (e.g. Thaler, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  Lastly, and perhaps most 
obviously, consumers may simply fail to get around to switching through procrastination 
(O’Donoghue, and Rabin, 2001).  Note that these explanations, unlike those above, do not 
necessarily imply a strong relationship between willingness to switch and accurate 
perceptions of gains from switching.     
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This approach to understanding consumer behaviour through behavioural economics has 
altered the economic analysis of industrial organisation.  Recent models show that where 
suppliers perceive a systematic behavioural bias among consumers, they may compete to 
exploit it, resulting in stable yet inefficient market equilibrium outcomes (Gabaix and 
Laibson, 2006; Grubb, 2015), in which some consumers are disadvantaged. In this context, 
better empirical evidence on which behavioural phenomena drive unwillingness to switch 
is needed.  
2.3   Bundling 
Theoretical studies over many years have shown that bundling of goods or services is 
often pro-competitive, but also that it may have anti-competitive effects depending upon 
the market context (Kobayashi, 2005).  There has been less research into how bundling 
affects consumer switching per se.  Some recent empirical literature has focused 
specifically on whether service providers may facilitate or deter switching.  In particular, 
service bundling may hinder switching by making it more difficult for consumers to 
compare services, while long-term contracts may prevent switching outright for the period 
of the contract (Xavier and Ypsilanti, 2008).   
Prince and Greenstein (2014) find that bundling reduces consumer switching in triple 
play
1
 telecoms services, but that this effect is only detectable at times when demand is 
“turbulent”, e.g. when demand for a service is declining.  This implies that bundling may 
be used by suppliers that offer services in shrinking segments of the market to slow their 
decline.  The authors also suggest that households who adopt bundled packages may differ 
from other households in various ways including perhaps their switching propensity.   
                                                 
1
 Bundled services including wired telephony, cable television and broadband Internet offered by cable 
operators. 
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Burnett (2014), using survey data from the UK telecoms market, finds that subscribers 
with bundled services are significantly less likely to switch supplier.  Having been with a 
supplier for either a very short (< 6 months) or very long (>4 years) period are found to 
reduce the likelihood of switching.  Among sociodemographic variables, only the oldest 
age group (>75 years old) is consistently less likely to switch than other age groups, 
middle income households are more likely than either higher or lower income groups, and 
having children in the household marginally reduces the switching probability.  The latter 
finding is in keeping with the view that families with children may have less time to 
devote to search and switching activity, although the increasingly intensive and diverse 
use of telecommunications devices by children and young people may counteract this 
effect. The paper underlines the importance of controlling for supplier- or service-related 
variables as well as individual characteristics, since the former improve model fit and alter 
estimated coefficients. 
2.4  Contribution of the present study 
In the context of this previous literature, the present paper contributes in a number of 
ways.  First, we add to what remains a relatively thin and somewhat contradictory 
literature on the determinants of switching, by examining a richer set of consumer and 
service characteristics associated with stronger or weaker switching intentions for a 
sample of telecoms service users in Ireland, casting light on some possible reasons for low 
switching. Second, we supplement previous examinations of the importance of expected 
gains from switching by controlling for bill shock, which is a potential confounding factor.  
Third, because the survey we exploit is recent and focuses on telecoms products only, we 
are able to control for detailed aspects of modern services, including bundling, whether 
consumers use a smart phone to access the internet, which provider they are presently 
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with, and multiple aspects of device usage.  This last set of responses is important in the 
context of a market undergoing such rapid technological change.  
 
3. Methodology 
In the remainder of this paper we use ordered logit regression models to explain switching 
intentions: the self-reported likelihood of consumers switching telecoms service provider 
in the next year.  In keeping with the previous evidence for market-specific effects, 
separate models are estimated for fixed line broadband, mobile telephony and landline 
telephony.  Where survey respondents have bundles that include the relevant service, they 
are included in the regressions with a dummy variable indicating a bundled service. 
Ordered logit models make efficient use of categorical data with a natural ordering (in this 
case, from ‘not at all likely’ to switch to ‘highly likely’).  However, these models require a 
parallel lines (sometimes called proportional odds) assumption that can be rejected by the 
data.  In essence, ordered logit assumes that each regressor has a uniform effect across the 
full range of the dependent variable.  Since this is not necessarily so in practice, we also 
estimate partial proportional odds models to allow for varying effects from variables 
where the parallel lines assumption is rejected while preserving the assumption for other 
variables that do not depart from parallelism to a statistically significant extent.  We 
employ Stata 14 for estimation; the ologit command is used for ordered logit models and 
gologit2 for the partial proportional odds versions. 
Based on theory and previous empirical studies cited above, we expect to see the 
following effects (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Summary of expected effects on switching intentions 
Having switched in the past  Positive 
Having been with the supplier a long time Negative 
Bill shock Positive 
Being on a bundled package Negative, especially for landline services 
(for which subscriptions are declining over 
time) 
Expected gain from switching Positive 
Children in household Negative 
Older respondent Negative 
Household income Positive, but maybe with peak at middle 
incomes  
 
4. Data employed 
ComReg commissioned RedC to do a consumer ICT survey in 2015; this is discussed in 
RedC (2015) and ComReg (2016).  The survey yielded 1,039 observations of Irish 
consumers, each of whom answered affirmatively to the screening question “Can I check 
you are responsible or jointly responsible for the selection of telecommunications supplier 
and/or pay the telecommunications bills for your household?”.  Descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in this paper are listed in Annex 1, Table 6 and Table 7. 
4.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables used in this study are derived from responses to a question asked 
about each individual or bundled service to which a survey respondent subscribes: “How 
likely are you to consider switching your service provider within the next 12 months?”.  
We focus on the answers relating to fixed broadband, landline telephony and mobile 
telephony services, and in each regression we include both respondents who subscribe to 
these services on a stand-alone basis and those who purchase them as part of bundles.  The 
responses are categorical, with five categories expressing increasing intention to switch 
(Not at all likely, Not very likely, Neither likely/unlikely, Quite likely, Very likely), plus 
’Currently tied to contract and not able to switch’ and ’Don’t know’.  We exclude the 
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latter two groups from the sample, which allows us to treat the remaining five categories 
as ordinal.
2
  Thus a positive coefficient or an odds ratio higher than one can be interpreted 
as showing a positive association between a regressor and the likelihood of considering 
switching in the coming year. 
4.2 Variables used to test the main hypotheses 
Past switching behaviour and tenure with current supplier.  To capture possible 
interactions between these two consumer characteristics, we include a four-way 
categorical variable.  Categories are ‘Past switcher, short time with supplier’ (used as the 
reference category), Past switcher, >3 years with supplier, Non-switcher, short time with 
supplier and Non-switcher, >3 years with supplier.  The variable is constructed from the 
answers to two questions:  
 “Have you previously purchased this service from other service provider(s)?”  We 
classify respondents as switchers if they say ‘Yes’ to this question.  Those who say 
‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know/Can’t remember’ are classified as non-switchers.  Past 
switchers of broadband, landline or bundled services are all taken to be switchers 
when assessing any of these services, whereas past switching of mobile services is 
evaluated separately because the switching processes for fixed line and mobile 
services may seem significantly different from the consumer’s point of view. 
 How long do you have your [service or bundle] with [service provider]? 
Non-bundled service subscription.  We include a dummy variable in each regression that 
takes a value of 1 if the respondent has a stand-alone subscription to the relevant service 
                                                 
2
 While respondents who say they cannot switch because of a contract are excluded from the sample, other 
respondents may or may not be on contracts. This information is not available from the survey. 
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and zero otherwise (i.e. the service is part of a bundled package).  Including this term 
allows us to test the hypothesis that bundling deters switching. 
Expected savings if the respondent were to switch.  This categorical variable is based 
on the following question, which is asked about each service to which a respondent 
subscribes: “What percentage saving on your current monthly bill for [service or bundle] 
do you think you could receive if you put in the time and effort to search for the best 
deal?”.  To eliminate small cells the categories used here (0%, 1-10%, 11-20%, More than 
20%, Don't know) were aggregated from a more detailed set of categories in the survey. 
Bill shock indicator.   This takes a value of 1 for those answering ‘Yes’ to “Thinking 
about your [service or bundle] have you ever received a bill or paid more for a service than 
you expected?” and 0 for those responding ‘No’. 
4.3 Service characteristics 
A specific set of characteristics is included depending upon which telecoms service is 
being examined (broadband, mobile telephony or landline telephony). 
Fixed line broadband. A categorical variable identifying the supplier includes the 
following categories: Eir (reference); UPC; Vodafone at Home; Sky Broadband; and 
Others.  
Questions are included on whether the respondent’s package includes TV service and, if 
the household watches TV, whether they mainly do so using cable or IPTV. 
Responses to the question “Which of the following devices are connected to your 
broadband service and used within your home?” are used to provide a set of dummy 
variables.  The items included are Desktop computer; Laptop computer; Smart Phone 
which is able to access the internet/data on your phone (iPhone, Android, Blackberry); 
Tablet computer (iPad); Gaming console (PlayStation, Xbox or Nintendo Wii); Mobile 
  17 
gaming device (PSP, Nintendo DS); eReader (Kindle, Kobo); Smart TV (TV that connects 
to the internet); MP3/Digital music player; and Mobile internet device – iPod 
Touch/Netbook. 
Mobile telephony. A categorical variable identifying the supplier includes the following 
categories: Vodafone (reference); O2/3; Meteor; and MVNOs and resellers. 
A prepay contract dummy is assigned 1 for those respondents answering ‘prepay’ to 
“Thinking about your main personal mobile phone service provider, do you have a fixed 
term contract with a monthly bill, or do you have a prepay phone where you buy 
vouchers/top ups?” 
A data warning dummy is assigned 1 for respondent answering ‘Yes’ to “Ever received a 
text message saying you are close to your data allowance?”. 
Responses to the question “What do you personally use your mobile telephone for?” are 
used to provide a set of dummy variables.  The items included are To make/receive calls 
domestically;  To make calls to and from abroad; To make/receive traditional text 
messages, i.e. SMS; Browsing the Internet; Send/receive email; To use Social Media (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest); Instant Messaging on Facebook, WhatsApp, 
Viber or Snap Chat; Use mobile apps or shop online; Download/Stream Video or Music; 
and Use VoiP (e.g. Skype) services. 
Landline telephony. A categorical variable identifying the supplier includes the following 
categories: Eir (reference), UPC, Vodafone at Home, Sky Talk and Others.  
There is a dummy variable for “"Landline required for alarm monitoring system to work” 
and another for “While I have the landline it is not used at all”. 
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4.4 Sociodemographic variables 
Categorical variables are included for the household income, age, employment status, 
housing tenure and marital status of the respondent. 
Dummy variables (1/0) are included for the presence of children in the respondent’s 
household and receipt of social welfare benefits. 
5. Results 
The following regression models aim to identify the main factors associated with strength 
of switching intentions by telecoms service.  In each case, both the full model and a 
parsimonious model excluding collectively insignificant regressors are shown. For ease of 
interpretation, results are reported as odds ratios rather than coefficients on log odds, such 
that values significantly above 1 indicate a positive association with switching intentions 
while values below one indicate a negative relationship.  To provide some intuition on 
how to read these statistics, an odds ratio of 2 implies that a factor is associated with a 
doubling in the odds of a one-step increase along the switching preference scale, whereas 
an odds ratio of 0.5 relates to a halving of the odds. 
5.1 Broadband regression results 
We start with fixed line broadband services, shown in Table 2 below.  Respondents who 
have never switched before and have been with their suppliers for more than three years 
have significantly weaker switching intentions than past switchers who only recently 
started their supplier relationships.  No other combination of switching history or tenure 
with supplier proved statistically significant, although the coefficients are suggestive of 
the expected pattern of effects. 
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Table 2: Broadband switching intentions models; ordered logit regression; dependent 
variable is "How likely are you to consider switching your service provider within 
the next 12 months?" From 1: Not at all likely to 5: Very likely 
 Full model Parsimonious model
3
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Non-bundle broadband user 0.614 0.157* 0.691 0.147* 
Fixed line broadband bill shock 3.57 1.151*** 3.327 1.011*** 
Past switcher, short time with supplier REF  REF  
Past switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.603 0.170* 0.687 0.17 
Non-switcher, short time with supplier 0.753 0.195 REF  
Non-switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.421 0.0976*** 0.511 0.0926*** 
Saving expected = 0% REF  REF  
Saving expected = 1-10% 2.37 0.750*** 2.837 0.836*** 
Saving expected = 11-20% 1.524 0.502 1.63 0.501 
Saving expected = >20% 2.5 1.010** 2.695 1.005*** 
Saving expected = Don't know 1.577 0.467 1.557 0.427 
Children in household? 1.806 0.375*** 1.71 0.317*** 
AGE: 18-24 0.626 0.302 REF  
AGE: 25-34 1.03 0.29 REF  
AGE: 35-44 REF  REF  
AGE: 45-54 1.206 0.307 REF  
AGE: 55-64 2.116 0.681** 2.092 0.496*** 
AGE: 65+ 2.339 1.030*   
Working full time REF  REF  
Working part time 0.89 0.238 REF  
Unemployed 1.255 0.486 REF  
Home duties 0.463 0.134*** 0.491 0.129*** 
Full time student 2.135 1.028 REF  
Retired 0.43 0.162** 0.45 0.140** 
Private rented accommodation 2.029 0.617** 1.959 0.492*** 
Council provided accommodation 1.017 0.391 REF  
Own home with mortgage REF  REF  
Own home; no mortgage 1.14 0.274 REF  
In parents' home or Other 0.96 0.417 REF  
Social welfare recipient? 0.745 0.221   
Smart Phone able to access internet 1.66 0.365** 1.731 0.344*** 
Bundle includes TV service 0.989 0.363   
HH main TV uses cable or IPTV 0.674 0.231   
Marital status categories N.S.    
Fixed broadband provider N.S.    
Income categories N.S.    
Other applications or devices used N.S.    
Constant cut1 2.36 1.404 4.069 1.435*** 
                                                 
3
 Wald test of jointly restricting insignificant coefficients to zero: p=0.553 
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 Full model Parsimonious model
3
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Constant cut2 7.054 4.233*** 11.65 4.220*** 
Constant cut3 12.88 7.789*** 20.82 7.695*** 
Constant cut4 33.91 20.95*** 52.85 20.63*** 
Observations 660 660 
Notes: OR = odds ratio; SE = standard error; REF = reference category; N.S. = not statistically significant; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Respondents who subscribe to broadband outside a bundle are marginally less likely to 
report willingness to switch than those with a bundled package.  This variable will be 
discussed in more detail later, when we relax the constraint that effects are constant across 
changes in the dependent variable categories. 
Having previously experienced bill shock shows the expected positive, significant 
association with switching intentions.  This effect size is large.  Not surprisingly, 
households that expect no savings from switching were less likely to favour it.  However, 
there is no clear pattern between the level of expected savings and strength of switching 
intentions. 
For broadband services, households with children are significantly more likely to consider 
switching than those without them.  Respondents who are over 55 share this positive 
association, but those who report being retired are significantly less likely to favour 
switching.  This may hint at an interaction effect, with working people over 55 being more 
favourable to switching than their retired counterparts.  Few other socioeconomic factors 
showed any statistical significance, although respondents working on home duties have a 
similarly negative coefficient to retirees. 
Respondents in rented accommodation report greater willingness to switch broadband 
provider than the reference group with mortgages.  Those with smartphones that are 
internet-capable also had somewhat stronger switching intentions.  This may reflect easier 
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access to information and hence lower search and switching costs, or it could have to do 
with other unobserved characteristics of those who use smartphones (e.g. greater average 
intensity of ICT use?). 
Other characteristics showed no significant associations with switching intentions, 
including income group, marital status, the identity of the fixed broadband service 
provider, whether the service bundle included TV service, and use of several other ICT 
applications or devices.  
5.2 Mobile telephony regression results 
The results for mobile telephony switching intentions show similarities with the broadband 
models (Table 3 below).  Long-standing customers who have never switched before are 
again much less likely to switch than those with a shorter relationship and past switching 
experience.  Bill shock is a significant positive factor, and working on home duties is a 
negative one. 
Table 3: Mobile telephony switching intentions models; ordered logit regression; 
dependent variable is "How likely are you to consider switching your service 
provider within the next 12 months?" From 1: Not at all likely to 5: Very likely 
 Full model Parsimonious model
4
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Non-bundle mobile telephony user 1.666 0.79   
Mobile bill shock indicator 2.182 0.500*** 1.847 0.384*** 
Past switcher, short time with supplier REF  REF  
Past switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.668 0.163* 0.555 0.121*** 
Non-switcher, short time with supplier 1.508 0.459 REF  
Non-switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.379 0.0826*** 0.306 0.0539*** 
Percentage saving expected = 0 REF  REF  
Percentage saving expected = 1-10% 0.786 0.296 REF  
Percentage saving expected = 11-20% 1.904 0.756 REF  
Percentage saving expected = More than 20% 6.994 3.081*** 5.791 2.038*** 
Percentage saving expected = Don't know 1.376 0.422 REF  
Percentage saving expected = No response 1.734 1.642 REF  
                                                 
4
 Wald test of jointly restricting insignificant coefficients to zero: p=0.157 
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 Full model Parsimonious model
4
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Children in household? 1.349 0.244*   
AGE: 18-24 2.607 1.022**   
AGE: 25-34 1.108 0.275   
AGE: 35-44 REF    
AGE: 45-54 1.078 0.254   
AGE: 55-64 1.015 0.307   
AGE: 65+ 1.203 0.492   
Working full time REF  REF  
Working part time 0.922 0.219 REF  
Unemployed 0.826 0.279 REF  
Home duties 0.536 0.139** 0.649 0.149* 
Full time student 0.41 0.171** 0.889 0.283 
Retired 0.592 0.199 REF  
Social welfare recipient? 0.554 0.136** 0.578 0.115*** 
Income <15,000 2.438 0.828***   
Income 15,000-25,000 REF    
Income 25,000-35,000 0.867 0.264   
Income 35,000-50,000 1.344 0.398   
Income 50,000-75,000 1.984 0.755*   
Income 75,000+ 0.541 0.294   
Income No answer/refused 1.255 0.309   
Main mobile phone provider = VODAFONE REF  REF  
Main mobile phone provider = O2/3 1.248 0.231 REF  
Main mobile phone provider = Meteor 0.521 0.124*** 0.539 0.111*** 
Main mobile phone provider = MVNOs & resellers 0.5 0.150** 0.416 0.105*** 
Prepaid mobile 0.829 0.753   
Ever got text saying you were near data allowance? 0.776 0.135   
Make/receive traditional text messages i.e. SMS 2.369 0.506*** 2.225 0.431*** 
Marital status categories N.S.    
Housing tenure categories N.S.    
Other applications or devices used N.S.    
Constant cut1 3.284 3.001 1.293 0.297 
Constant cut2 10.55 9.668** 3.912 0.914*** 
Constant cut3 20.96 19.26*** 7.609 1.847*** 
Constant cut4 50.26 46.57*** 17.9 4.824*** 
Observations 888 888 
Notes: OR = odds ratio; SE = standard error; REF = reference category; N.S. = not statistically significant; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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However, there are differences too.  While expecting a large saving (>20%) has a very 
sizeable positive effect compared to expecting no savings, other levels of expected savings 
had low significance levels. 
In this case we do not see significant associations with retirement or the highest age band, 
but instead find that being in receipt of social welfare is associated with weaker switching 
intentions.  Being a customer of a newer network operator with a lower market share than 
the other two (Meteor) or a mobile virtual network operator is associated with weaker 
switching intentions.  Finally, respondents who report that they make or receive SMS 
messages also report stronger intentions toward switching. 
We find no significant association with prepaid vs. post-paid mobile contracts, housing 
tenure or use of a range of other mobile applications.  There seems to be no robust 
association with income either. 
5.3 Landline telephony regression results 
The results of the landline regressions are shown in Table 4 4 below.  Being a non-bundle 
subscriber is unimportant in this specification although, as in the broadband model, this 
picture changes when we allow the coefficient to vary by dependent variable category 
(discussed later).There is less, though some, evidence that bill shock has an effect for 
landline.  
Table 4: Landline telephony switching intentions models; ordered logit regression; 
dependent variable is "How likely are you to consider switching your service 
provider within the next 12 months?" From 1: Not at all likely to 5: Very likely 
 Full model Parsimonious model
5
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Non-bundle landline user 1.003 0.271 0.99 0.25 
Landline bill shock indicator 1.793 0.674 1.818 0.652* 
Past switcher, short time with supplier REF  REF  
                                                 
5
 Wald test of jointly restricting insignificant coefficients to zero: p=0.153 
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 Full model Parsimonious model
5
 
Variables OR SE OR SE 
Past switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.594 0.169* 0.709 0.181 
Non-switcher, short time with supplier 0.638 0.192 REF  
Non-switcher, >3 years with supplier 0.31 0.0780*** 0.406 0.0813*** 
Percentage saving expected = 0 REF  REF  
Percentage saving expected =  1-10% 2.321 0.830** 2.718 0.937*** 
Percentage saving expected =  11-20% 1.654 0.61 1.739 0.615 
Percentage saving expected =  More than 20% 3.435 1.584*** 4.031 1.760*** 
Percentage saving expected =  Don't know 1.845 0.609* 1.796 0.567* 
Children in household? 2.089 0.468*** 1.63 0.325** 
AGE: 18-24 0.571 0.388 REF  
AGE: 25-34 1.267 0.401 REF  
AGE: 35-44 REF  REF  
AGE: 45-54 1.541 0.429 REF  
AGE: 55-64 2.376 0.786*** 1.804 0.421** 
AGE: 65+ 1.856 0.786 REF  
Working full time REF  REF  
Working part time 0.68 0.198 REF  
Unemployed 1.559 0.696 REF  
Home duties 0.332 0.103*** 0.372 0.103*** 
Full time student 2.546 1.741 REF  
Retired 0.386 0.135*** 0.489 0.129*** 
Married REF  REF  
Living as married/Co-habiting 1.18 0.533 REF  
Single 1.549 0.555 REF  
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.461 0.175** 0.471 0.170** 
Private rented accommodation 1.988 0.744* 2.105 0.669** 
Council provided accommodation 0.596 0.284 REF  
Own home with mortgage REF  REF  
Own home; no mortgage 1.306 0.326 REF  
In parents' home or Other 0.493 0.238 REF  
Social welfare recipient? 0.671 0.225   
Landline required for alarm monitoring 2.171 0.706** 2.152 0.679** 
Landline is not used at all 1.974 0.848   
Income band N.S.    
Landline supplier N.S.    
Constant cut1 1.636 0.886 2.126 0.730** 
Constant cut2 5.312 2.910*** 6.522 2.301*** 
Constant cut3 10.12 5.608*** 12.07 4.360*** 
Constant cut4 25.7 14.63*** 29.54 11.32*** 
Observations 575 575 
Notes: OR = odds ratio; SE = standard error; REF = reference category; N.S. = not statistically significant; 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The pattern of associations with expected savings is similar to those for broadband 
services, with a higher estimated odds ratio for those who expect savings in excess of 
20%. The effects for children in the household, working on home duties, being in the 
oldest age group and being retired are also similar to those for broadband.  Respondents 
who are widowed, divorced or separated report a lower than average disposition towards 
switching landlines than the reference category (married).  The modest number of 
respondents (46) who require a landline for alarm monitoring report a stronger than 
average intention to switch service provider. 
5.4 Coefficients that vary across levels of the dependent variables 
For most variables discussed in this section, diagnostic results were consistent with the 
“parallel lines” assumption that underlies the ordered logit estimator.  In these cases it is 
reasonable to treat the coefficients as stable over the full range of ordered categories.  
However, a few variables showed significant variation over the categories when we re-
estimated the regressions as partial proportional odds models.  Their odds ratios are 
reported by category in Table 5.   
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Table 5: Odds ratios that vary significantly across categories in the parsimonious 
models, i.e. lines not parallel; Italic = not significant at 95% level; dependent variable 
is "How likely are you to consider switching your service provider within the next 12 
months?" From 1: Not at all likely to 5: Very likely 
 Category 
Model Variable 1 vs. 2-5 1-2 vs. 3-5 1-3 vs. 4-5 1-4 vs. 5 
Broadband Non-bundle user 0.535 1.07 1.57 1.45 
 Bill shock indicator 1.49 3.50 4.64 16.6 
 Expected saving >20% 2.29 1.87 2.61 8.46 
 Children in household 1.89 1.71 1.450 0.526 
      
Mobile Percentage saving >20% 2.92 5.06 8.59 8.59 
 Social welfare recipient 0.454 0.874 1.41 2.06 
      
Landline Non-bundle user 0.751 1.80 2.12 2.71 
 Bill shock indicator 1.16 2.10 2.89 10.50 
 Expected saving >20% 3.47 2.84 3.91 15.60 
 Expected saving not known 2.13 1.12 1.17 1.52 
 Children in household 1.82 1.31 1.23 0.482 
 
Bundling is associated with weaker switching intentions for landline users, and this effect 
is more pronounced for those who are more open to the idea of switching.  In contrast, 
bundling is associated with stronger switching intentions for broadband users, but only at 
the lowest level of switching preference.  This is a clearer statistical signal in both cases 
than the marginal significance found earlier in the logit models. 
Bill shock still has a generally positive and significant association with switching 
preferences, but for mobile and landline services the effect size rises considerably as 
openness to switching increases.  There are similar patterns for those expecting cost 
savings of greater than 20%; this is consistent with somewhat higher switching 
preferences for those not otherwise much inclined to switch, but a dramatically positive 
association for relatively keen switchers.  
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There are reversals in the direction of association along the spectrum of switching 
preferences for broadband users with children and for mobile users in receipt of social 
welfare. 
6. Discussion and future research 
An important consistency to emerge from the present analysis is that long-standing 
subscribers who have never switched before seem to be exceptionally resistant to 
considering switching in all three services we examined.  Neither being a long-standing 
user nor having never switched is, on its own, a key factor; the combination of the two is 
what matters.  As can be seen from the descriptive data supplied in Annex 1 (Table 6), 
roughly half of our sample fell into this group.  The findings suggest that it may be 
increasingly hard to get this core group of non-switchers to participate in search and 
switching activities as time passes.  From a policy perspective, this implication is a 
concern.  As discussed in Section 2, multiple models in behavioural industrial organisation 
imply equilibrium outcomes in which groups identified by their decision-making can be 
disadvantaged relative to other groups (Grubb, 2015).   
A contribution of the current paper is to unconfound, on the one hand, expected economic 
gains from switching, and on the other, bill shock. Our results show that bill shock is 
strongly associated with a preference for switching, dramatically so where respondents are 
already somewhat inclined in that direction.  This is consistent with the emphasis placed 
on the consumer-supplier relationship in the marketing literature reviewed in Section 2 
and with behavioural models that emphasise individuals’ refusal to do business with 
providers they perceive to act unfairly.  Given the strength of the effect we find, it would 
seem prudent to propose that future surveys designed to investigate switching try to 
include an indicator of bill shock and, perhaps, to explore other measures of the strength or 
otherwise of the consumer-supplier relationship.  Nevertheless, controlling for bill shock, 
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we find expected savings from switching are also positively associated with switching 
intentions, especially when savings of more than 20% are expected and, again, especially 
when the respondent is already leaning towards switching.  The fact that these associations 
are weakest for those with the lowest level of switching preference may help to explain the 
high estimates of the savings that would be required to prompt a majority to switch across 
multiple markets (Waddams Price and Zhou, 2016).  The implication is that many people 
who perceive more modest gains, but gains nonetheless, are not willing to switch.  This 
behaviour is consistent with the theories based on ownership and competence described in 
Subsection 2.2, though it does not distinguish between them.  Future work is needed to 
tease apart the psychological mechanisms behind this stickiness, which reinforces the 
challenge of getting long-time non-switchers to engage. Even bill shocks and the 
availability of significant savings may not always be enough to move them, unless they are 
already somewhat inclined to switch.  
We found mixed evidence regarding the effect of bundling on switching. Bundling seems 
to be associated with lower switching preferences for landline customers who are at least 
somewhat open to the idea of switching.  This result is broadly consistent with the view 
expressed by Prince and Greenstein (2014) that it should be easier to detect a negative 
effect of bundling on switching in a market that is declining: alone among the services 
studied here, landline telephony is in decline.  However, we also found some evidence of a 
positive association between bundling and switching intentions for broadband among 
users least likely to consider switching.  This finding therefore contrasts with the strong, 
consistent effect reported by Burnett (2014).  One possibility is that as bundling becomes 
more common, technology develops, and more suppliers offer a greater variety of bundles, 
an initial tendency to stick with suppliers offering apparently convenient bundles may give 
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way to more vigorous consumer activity. Since the bundling of telecoms products is 
increasingly common, this is an issue that future studies need to address further.   
Various background characteristics were significantly associated with higher or lower 
levels of switching it the three markets, although not as strongly as bill shock and expected 
savings. What is perhaps striking is the inconsistency of these relationships across studies 
and separate telecoms markets. The exception was individuals working in home duties, 
who were consistently less likely to express a willingness to switch.  We do not know 
much about how responsibility for switching decisions is shared within households.  
Relative to the 35-44 years base category, over-55s were more inclined to switch 
broadband and landline but not mobile supplier (although the effect was offset if they were 
retired); younger consumers had the opposite pattern. These results are somewhat different 
again from the U-shaped age profile of switchers across telecoms and non-telecoms 
markets recorded by Waddams Price and Zhu (2016).  Broadband and landline households 
who are otherwise reluctant to switch appear to be more willing to consider switching 
when children are present.  This contradicts the findings of Burnett (2014), although the 
coefficient in that paper was only marginally significant when service controls were 
included.  It is consistent with the view outlined in Subsection 2.3 that greater intensity 
and diversity of usage within the household may prompt consumer activity.  Other 
characteristics, including income, being in receipt of welfare, renting, being a student, and 
being a smartphone user are significant for one market but not others.  The inconsistency 
of these effects, within our study and across studies, implies that willingness to switch is 
generally not a consistent characteristic of certain social groups, but is more complex and 
context specific.  For instance, it is notable that over and above the greater inclination of 
young adults to switch mobile provider, switching is significantly less likely among the 
25% of consumers who do not use SMS messaging, and that the associated effect size is 
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similarly substantial. Given such findings, one possibility for future research to explore is 
whether different individuals feel different levels of competence to make an active 
decision in different telecoms markets, perhaps depending on their familiarity and use of 
the technology.  Another useful avenue would be to collect data on switching intentions 
and to return later to the same sample to learn if actual switching followed.  One could 
then explore the links between switching intention and action in these markets. 
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Annex 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Table 6: Sample shares for variables common to all models 
Variables Broadband % Mobile % Landline % 
Not at all likely to switch 59 65 60 
Not very likely to switch 19 18 20 
Neither likely/unlikely to switch 7.6 7 7.5 
Quite likely to switch 7.4 5.3 6.8 
Very likely to switch 6.4 4.8 6.1 
Non-bundle user 21 96 20 
Previously experienced bill shock 7.7 12 6.4 
Past switcher, short time with supplier 25 19 24 
Past switcher, >3 years with supplier 14 17 16 
Non-switcher, short time with supplier 17 7.9 12 
Non-switcher, >3 years with supplier 44 56 48 
Saving expected = 0% 14 9.2 13 
Saving expected = 1-10% 19 8 18 
Saving expected = 11-20% 17 5.3 17 
Saving expected = >20% 7.3 3.8 6.6 
Saving expected = Don't know 42 21 45 
Saving expected = No response  52  
Children in household? 58 54 53 
AGE: 18-24 8.5 8.4 5.4 
AGE: 25-34 18 19 14 
AGE: 35-44 22 22 20 
AGE: 45-54 22 20 22 
AGE: 55-64 15 15 17 
AGE: 65+ 13 15 22 
Working full time 46 44 42 
Working part time 12 11 12 
Unemployed 7.9 9.7 5.7 
Home duties 13 14 15 
Full time student 5.8 5.1 4 
Retired 16 16 22 
Married/civil partnership 66 60 70 
Living as married/co-habiting 8.2 8.8 4.9 
Single 20 22 16 
Widowed/divorced/separated 6.4 8.8 9.6 
Private rented accommodation 11 -8.7 7 
Council provided accommodation 8 11 6.6 
Own home with mortgage 37 33 35 
Own home; no mortgage 34 33 42 
In parents' home or Other 9.8 8.9 8.9 
Social welfare recipient? 15 23 17 
Income <€15000 6.1 10 7.1 
Income €15,000 to <€25,000 14 18 13 
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Variables Broadband % Mobile % Landline % 
Income €25,000 to <€35,000 15 13 14 
Income €35,000 to<€50,000 15 12 16 
Income €50,000 to <€75,000 6.2 5.1 6.6 
Income €75,000+ 3.8 3.2 3.7 
Income – no response 40 38 39 
 
Table 7: Sample shares for variables specific to particular services 
Variables % 
Broadband  
Bundle includes TV service 38 
HH main TV uses cable or IPTV 34 
Main broadband provider = Eir 33 
Main broadband provider = UPC 33 
Main broadband provider = Vodafone 20 
Main broadband provider = Sky 10 
Main broadband provider = Others 4.4 
Desktop computer 26 
Laptop computer 87 
Smart Phone able to access the 
internet 
70 
Tablet computer 56 
Gaming console 24 
Mobile gaming device 8.6 
eReader 13 
Smart TV 18 
MP3/Digital music player 7.9 
Mobile internet device – iPod 
Touch/Netbook 
13 
Mobile  
Prepaid mobile user 53 
Ever got text saying you were near 
data allowance? 
33 
Main mobile provider = Vodafone 42 
Main mobile provider = O2/3 28 
Main mobile provider = Meteor 19 
Main mobile provider = MVNOs & 
resellers 
11 
To make/receive calls domestically 98 
To make calls to and from abroad 37 
To make/receive traditional text 
messages i.e. SMS 
75 
Browsing the internet 57 
Send/receive email 49 
To use social media 45 
Instant Messaging 41 
Variables % 
Use mobile apps or shop online 34 
Download/stream video or music 14 
Use VoIP services. 9.6 
Landline required for alarm 
monitoring 
8 
Landline is not used at all 4.2 
Main landline provider = Eir 44 
Main landline provider = UPC 27 
Main landline provider = Vodafone at 
Home 
18 
Main landline provider = Sky Talk & 
Others 
11 
 
 
